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From Ivory Tower to Minnesota Supreme 
Court 
David Wippman† 
David Stras joined the University of Minnesota Law School 
faculty in 2004 and quickly established himself as a rising star, 
both as a teacher and a scholar. Only two years after he ar-
rived, he was named the Stanley V. Kinyon Tenure Track 
Teacher of the Year. The award came as no surprise. Students 
quickly came to hold Professor Stras in the highest regard. 
They appreciated his insights, the time he devoted to prepara-
tion, and his passion for his subject. Equally important, they 
knew how much he cared about them. His enthusiasm in class 
was apparent and infectious.  
But David’s concern for students was not confined to the 
classroom. David made it a personal mission to expand our stu-
dents’ clerkship opportunities. He worked tirelessly with judges 
at all levels, including many of his new colleagues on the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, to place as many students as possible. 
David also served as the Law Review advisor, helping the edi-
tors identify topics, plan symposia, and navigate the byzantine 
world of academic publishing. It therefore came as no surprise 
that the Law Review, on its own initiative, decided to organize 
and publish this Tribute to Justice Stras. 
David also quickly built a reputation as an accomplished 
and insightful observer of all things Supreme Court. Just a few 
years into his academic career, David published a series of im-
portant articles examining the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence, its docket, and its history, and rapidly established him-
self as a leading voice in contemporary constitutional debates. 
The quality and significance of David’s scholarship is hig-
hlighted in the contributions to this Tribute by Professors 
Johnson, Scott, and Stein. 
 
†  Dean of the Law School and William S. Pattee Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School. Copyright © 2011 by David Wippman. 
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As Professor Scott notes, there is some irony in David’s de-
cision to trade the classroom for the courtroom. After all, David 
spent his academic years dissecting, often critically, the work of 
judges at all levels, but especially the work of the Supreme 
Court. He has even proposed increasing judicial workloads to 
encourage judges to opt for early retirement. One has to wonder 
whether that prospect may look rather different to Justice 
Stras down the road. On the other hand, as Professor Stein ob-
serves, David has also argued (along with coauthor Ryan Scott) 
that Congress should offer Supreme Court Justices a golden 
parachute to make retirement more attractive. One might wish 
David had made a similar argument for life-tenured faculty be-
fore he joined the court. 
As Professor Johnson notes, David joined the insights of 
political science to those of law in developing his arguments. He 
backed his normative and theoretical positions with careful 
analysis of the available data. Like most other scholars, David 
had a clear point of view, one  not always widely shared by his 
colleagues. He had the courage of his convictions, but he did not 
let his convictions blind him to opposing arguments or data. 
His scholarship was the richer for it. 
David’s talents as a teacher and scholar were matched only 
by his warmth and collegiality. David loves the exchange of 
ideas. He does not shrink from intellectual debate; certainly, he 
has never hesitated to tell me when he thinks I’m wrong about 
something. No doubt he will not hesitate to dissent if he disa-
grees with a court majority. But when David does disagree with 
a colleague, he always has good reasons, he articulates them 
well, and, perhaps most important, he engages in good faith di-
alogue. He is open to persuasion, and even when he disagrees, 
he respects the positions of those with whom he disagrees. Da-
vid’s openness and intellectual integrity have earned him the 
respect and friendship of his faculty colleagues and students 
alike, whatever their own political leanings. 
I will miss seeing David in the classroom and at faculty 
meetings, but I’m heartened by the knowledge that David’s 
passion and mission haven’t changed. As a scholar and teacher, 
David was committed to advancing the administration of jus-
tice and the rule of law. He is now pursuing that same mission 
as a justice, and I have no doubt he will do so with the same in-
tellect, drive, and good humor he has shown on the faculty. 
As James Madison once noted, “Justice is the end of gov-
ernment. . . . It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it 
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be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”1 By trading 
the ivory tower for the courtroom, the suit for the robe, David 
has chosen to pursue justice in a different, and, I will have to 
concede, more direct way. The court’s gain is the Law School’s 
loss, but in the long run, we all benefit by having judges of Da-
vid’s caliber working to advance our shared mission of promot-
ing the rule of law. 
 





Distinguished Scholar, Dedicated 
Teacher, and now Justice: David R. Stras 
Robert A. Stein† 
On July 1, 2010, University of Minnesota Law School Pro-
fessor David R. Stras became the eighty-eighth justice on the 
Minnesota Supreme Court. He is only the second professor in 
the 123-year history of the Law School to be appointed to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.2 Professor Stras was a member of 
the Law School faculty from 2004 to 2010 and codirector of the 
Institute for Law and Politics at the Law School from 2007 to 
2010. In addition to his Law School appointment, Stras also 
held an appointment as an Associate Professor of Political 
Science (through affiliation) in the University of Minnesota Po-
litical Science Department.3 
During his six years as a member of the Law School facul-
ty, Stras achieved a distinguished record as a remarkable scho-
lar, teacher, and colleague. He taught courses in constitutional 
law, federal courts and jurisdiction, and criminal law, and pre-
pared additional courses in constitutional litigation and civil 
 
†  Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. 
Copyright © 2011 by Robert A. Stein. 
 2. Professor Maynard E. Pirsig was appointed to fill an unexpired term 
on the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1942. Randall Tietjen, Maynard E. Pirsig: 
A Chronology, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 787, 789 (1997). Professor Pirsig lat-
er became dean of the University of Minnesota Law School, and served in that 
capacity from 1948 to 1955. Id. at 790–91. 
 3. Professor Stras received his undergraduate degree (with highest dis-
tinction, and was Phi Beta Kappa), an MBA (honored as a top graduate of the 
program), and his law degree (order of the coif ) from the University of Kansas. 
He was editor-in-chief of the Criminal Procedure edition of the Kansas Law 
Review. Professor Stras clerked for Judge Melvin Brunetti on the Ninth Cir-
cuit, Judge Michael Luttig on the Fourth Circuit, and Associate Justice Cla-
rence Thomas on the Supreme Court of the United States. He also practiced 
law with the Washington, D.C. office of the law firm Sidley, Austin, Brown & 
Wood LLP before entering academia. From 2009 until his appointment to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in 2010, Professor Stras was of counsel in the Min-
neapolis office of Faegre & Benson LLP. 
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rights. His scholarship focused on the courts (especially appel-
late courts) and judges. Indeed, his distinguished scholarship 
marks him as one of the leading scholars in the country in 
these subjects. He has been a prolific scholar, authoring or 
coauthoring more than ten articles on courts and judges and a 
casebook on federal courts in the six years since joining the 
Minnesota law faculty. As he leaves the Law School to join the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, Stras has several writings in 
process. He is currently working on a book on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, examining the Supreme Court’s plenary and certiorari 
dockets, as well as several articles on the work of the Supreme 
Court. 
One of Stras’s recent articles, authored with Professor 
Shaun Pettigrew, The Rising Caseload in the Fourth Circuit: A 
Statistical and Institutional Analysis,4 exemplifies a focus of 
his scholarly work. In this article, the authors address the ris-
ing case load in the circuit courts “through the lens of the 
Fourth Circuit.”5 Stras and Pettigrew assert that the Fourth 
Circuit has successfully responded to a dramatically rising ca-
seload over the past thirty years by improving efficiency 
(through procedural and systemic mechanisms) instead of 
simply relying on visiting circuit or district judges or senior cir-
cuit judges.6 The authors attribute the Fourth Circuit’s in-
creased efficiency to such procedural changes as increasing the 
number of cases decided through unpublished opinions and de-
creasing the number of cases allotted oral argument time.7 Sys-
temic changes identified by the coauthors that have allowed the 
Fourth Circuit to improve its efficiency and keep pace with the 
increase in case load include an expanded role of law clerks and 
the introduction of a staff attorney position.8 The article is an 
important resource to appellate judges and courts struggling to 
identify ways to handle their ever-increasing caseloads from 
year to year. 
In a thought provoking 2007 article in the Minnesota Law 
Review, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit 
 
 4. David R. Stras & Shaun M. Pettigrew, The Rising Caseload in the 
Fourth Circuit: A Statistical and Institutional Analysis, 61 S.C. L. REV. 421 
(2010). 
 5. Id. at 423. 
 6. Id. at 428. 
 7. Id. at 432, 436. 
 8. Id. at 441, 443. 
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Again,9 Stras proposes a “Circuit Riding Act of 2007 . . . which 
would require [U.S. Supreme Court] Justices to spend approx-
imately five days per year hearing oral arguments with a panel 
of one or more of the U.S. courts of appeals.”10 The article sug-
gests that many of the arguments made in favor of Justices rid-
ing circuit in the 1800s are equally relevant today.11 The article 
argues that “riding circuit” was eliminated because of the Su-
preme Court’s larger case load and “difficulties and dangers as-
sociated with transcontinental travel,”12 and explains that 
these problems should no longer preclude the Supreme Court 
from riding circuit because the Supreme Court no longer hears 
as many cases and there have been dramatic improvements to 
travel.13 Stras argues that circuit riding is a good idea because 
it gets the Justices out of Washington, D.C., and introduces 
them to different communities, and also exposes them to what 
is going on in the lower courts.14 Stras distinguishes a circuit 
riding proposal by Professors Calabresi and Presser that would 
require Supreme Court Justices to spend four weeks each year 
riding circuit,15 and asserts that his proposal is preferable be-
cause the four weeks proposed by Calabresi and Presser is ex-
cessive—the Justices do not need it—and at a certain point re-
quiring Justices to ride circuit is no longer beneficial from an 
institutional improvement perspective.16 
Stras, together with coauthor Professor Ryan W. Scott, ad-
dressed the issue of life tenure for Supreme Court Justices in a 
2007 article in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 
An Empirical Analysis of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors 
Calabresi & Lindgren.17 This article responds to a well-
publicized proposal by Calabresi and Lindgren to eliminate life 
tenure for U.S. Supreme Court Justices and replace it with 
fixed, nonrenewable eighteen-year terms.18 Stras and Scott as-
 
 9. David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit 
Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710 (2007). 
 10. Id. at 1713. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1727. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1729–30. 
 15. Id. at 1742. 
 16. Id. 
 17. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical Analysis of Life Te-
nure: A Response to Professors Calabresi & Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 791 (2007). 
 18. Id. at 792. 
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sert that Calabresi and Lindgren’s empirical research is flawed, 
suffering from a “period-selection problem” and also “a date-of-
observation problem.”19 They challenge Calabresi and 
Lindgren’s observation that average tenure on the Supreme 
Court has increased dramatically since 1970, concluding that 
Calabresi and Lindgren’s findings are less persuasive using da-
ta covering longer time periods and selecting the Justice’s date 
of appointment (rather than when he leaves office) as the point 
of reference.20 
In their 2007 article, Stras and Scott also expand on an ar-
gument they made in a 2005 article, Retaining Life Tenure: The 
Case for a “Golden Parachute.”21 In this 2005 article, Professors 
Stras and Scott argue that rather than instituting a mandatory 
retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Congress should 
create a “golden parachute” by increasing their retirement ben-
efits, especially upon reaching an appropriate retirement age or 
upon certifying a mental or physical disability.22 The article ar-
gues that this is consistent with Judge Richard Posner’s analy-
sis that judges are rational actors and would respond like eve-
ryone else to economic incentives.23 
Stras returned to that subject in a 2006 Minnesota Law 
Review article, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retire-
ment.24 This article was written for a Minnesota Law Review 
Symposium titled “The Future of the Supreme Court: Institu-
tional Reform and Beyond,” and Stras wrote the foreword to the 
Symposium issue,25 as well as this article. Again Stras in this 
article supports Judge Posner’s view that judges, like everyone 
else, act in ways to maximize their own utility, and that eco-
nomic incentives can change the behavior of judges, including 
with respect to retirement.26 
 
 19. Id. at 830. 
 20. Id.  
 21. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a 
“Golden Parachute”, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2005).  
 22. Id. at 1400–01. 
 23. Id. at 1467; see also Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices 
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 
(1993).  
 24. David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2006).  
 25. David R. Stras & Karla Vehrs, Foreword, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2006). 
 26. Stras, supra note 24, at 1419. 
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In a provocative article in 2007, again authored with Pro-
fessor Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?,27 Stras and 
Scott make the surprising assertion that the statute allowing 
federal judges to assume senior status may be unconstitution-
al.28 This controversial conclusion is based upon arguments 
that the statute setting forth the options for judicial retire-
ment29 is inconsistent with other provisions of Title 28 and 
raises two constitutional objections under Article III and the 
Appointments Clause of the Constitution.30 The article doesn’t 
leave the senior judges in constitutional limbo, but proposes 
several ways to “fix” the statute so that it no longer raises con-
stitutional problems.31 
In two book reviews in 2008, Stras examines the difficult 
challenges presented by the politicization of judicial appoint-
ments. In an essay in the Texas Law Review, Understanding 
the New Politics of Judicial Appointments,32 Stras reviews two 
books on the subject: Benjamin Wittes, Confirmation Wars: 
Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times, and Jan Craw-
ford Greenburg, Supreme Conflict: The Inside Story of the 
Struggle for Control of the United States Supreme Court. Stras 
argues that neither book is able to account for “growing politi-
cization of the judicial appointments process.”33 Stras’s expla-
nation is that both structural and external forces have caused 
this phenomenon.34 In Stras’s view, the passing of the Seven-
teenth Amendment and “the proliferation of confirmation hear-
ings for judicial nominees, have driven the Senate to take a 
more active role.”35 Stras’s book review also argues that mass 
media and external interest groups have also put pressure on 
key players in the confirmation process.36 Finally, Stras ex-
 
 27. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007). 
 28. Id. at 456. 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). 
 30. Stras & Scott, supra note 27, at 456–57. 
 31. Id. at 516. 
 32. David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appoint-
ments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033 (2008) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, 
CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 
(2006) and JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (2007)). 
 33. Id. at 1034. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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presses his view that “the Court’s own ventures into conten-
tious areas of social policy—such as school integration, abor-
tion, and homosexual rights—have raised the stakes 
of confirmation battles even higher.”37 In this contention, Pro-
fessor Stras weighs in on the issue in a very controversial way. 
In the second book review published in 2008, then-
Professor Stras joins again with Professor Scott in a review of 
Christopher Eisgruber’s widely read book, The Next Justice: 
Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process.38 Stras 
and Scott describe Eisgruber’s book as a useful critique of the 
two most prevalent narratives regarding how Justices decide 
cases: Justices as “umpires” and Justices as “politicians in 
robes.”39 But the book review finds fault with Eisgruber’s pro-
posal on how to reform the appointment process. The review 
characterizes Eisgruber’s proposed reform as asking the Senate 
“to confirm only ‘moderate’ Justices.”40 In the view of Stras and 
Scott, the most critical flaw in Eisgruber’s proposal is that it 
fails to “account for the institutional strength of the Presi-
dent.”41 More specifically, the authors assert that the President 
has a number of tools available to shape the Senate confirma-
tion process, including “strategic selection, the bully pulpit, re-
cess appointments, and legislative tactics such as logrolling and 
veto threats.”42 
In a 2009 article in the Vanderbilt Law Review, Pierce But-
ler: A Supreme Technician,43 Stras analyzes Associate Justice 
Pierce Butler’s tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court and under-
takes the task of explaining why Butler has been largely ig-
nored by Supreme Court scholars and noted only as one of the 
“Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” who prevented President 
Roosevelt from implementing many of the New Deal reforms.44 
In this article, Stras advances four reasons why Butler has 
been largely ignored by Supreme Court scholars: (1) Butler 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating the New Politics of Judi-
cial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869 (2008) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007)). 
 39. Id. at 1871. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1872. 
 42. Id. at 1916. 
 43. David R. Stras, Pierce Butler: A Supreme Technician, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 695 (2009). 
 44. Id. at 696.  
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wrote on highly technical areas of the law, including public util-
ities regulation and tax law; (2) Butler’s approach to writing 
opinions “stressed simplicity and minimalism”; (3) Butler 
served on the Supreme Court at the time of other more distin-
guished Justices such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin 
Cardozo, William Howard Taft, and Louis Brandeis; and (4) 
Butler fell on the wrong side of history in that he was a strict 
adherent to Lochner.45 This article, which is of particular inter-
est to readers from Butler’s home state of Minnesota, charts 
Butler’s life and scholarship and makes the claim that Butler’s 
service on the Supreme Court should not be regarded as a fail-
ure, because, indeed, he “made some modest contributions to 
the development of American law.”46 More specifically, Stras 
observed that Butler was a supporter of the rights of defen-
dants in criminal procedural law47 and that Butler “embrace[d] 
. . . robust notions of personal liberty and private property,”48 
which explains his strict adherence to Lochner.49 
Another Stras publication during his time on the Minneso-
ta Law School faculty is a 2006 book review in the Texas Law 
Review, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law 
Clerks in the Certiorari Process.50 In this article, Stras reviews 
two books examining the role of the Supreme Court law clerk 
through the eyes of the law clerk. The books are Todd C. Pep-
pers, Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of 
the Supreme Court Law Clerk and Artemus Ward and David 
Weiden, Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the 
United States Supreme Court. Stras’s review concludes that the 
two books advance the scholarly discussion of the role of the 
Supreme Court law clerk, but finds that they are each deficient 
in particular ways. The review criticizes the Peppers’s book for 
failing to draw any conclusions from its data51 and the Ward 
and Weiden book for oversimplifying the relationship between 
 
 45. Id. at 696–97. 
 46. Id. at 697. 
 47. Id. at 756.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law 
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947 (2007) (reviewing TODD C. 
PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. 
WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006)). 
 51. Id. at 949. 
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the law clerk and the Supreme Court Justice.52 An interesting 
part of this essay is that it uses material gathered in the re-
viewed books to address the influence of the Supreme Court 
law clerks on the Supreme Court workload. Stras observes that 
the Supreme Court’s docket has decreased significantly over 
the last twenty years and examines 20,000 certiorari pool me-
mos from four Supreme Court terms to determine the impact of 
the certiorari pool on the Court’s declining docket.53 Stras con-
cludes that “earlier studies too quickly dismissed the potential 
impact of law clerks and the certiorari pool on the size of the 
Court’s plenary docket.”54 
Stras’s distinguished scholarship was not limited to tradi-
tional law review publications, and he shared his research and 
writing with a broader audience beyond the academy. Professor 
Stras has reached out with his ideas by having contributed to 
and edited blogs,55 having written op-ed pieces for newspa-
pers,56 having written and filed amicus briefs in litigated cas-
es,57 having been quoted in the American Bar Association 
Journal,58 and having served as a regular source for comment 
in the print and electronic media.59 The quality of a great scho-
lar is not only to produce significant works of scholarship, but 
to reach out to the bench and bar and the public and share 
these ideas. Stras understands that concept, and accomplished 
an extraordinary record during his time on the Minnesota fa-
culty. He made over forty presentations on legal subjects at 
symposiums, panels, and other programs at law schools, bar 
associations, and professional organizations since 2005. These 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 950. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. BLOG, http://www.elsblog 
.org/; David Stras, A Classist Argument?, BALKINIZATION (July 13, 2009), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/07/classist-argument_13.html. 
 56. See, e.g., David Stras, Don’t Trade Independence for High-Court Term 
Limits, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 13, 2005, at 9B; David Stras, Hail to the 
Chief, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 8, 2005, at 9B; David R. Stras, O’Connor 
Retiring with Dignity from the Supreme Court, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 
12, 2005, at 7B. 
 57. See, e.g., Rochelle Olson, Pawlenty’s Picks Keep High Court Tilting 
Right, STAR TRIB. May 14, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 10045389. 
 58. See, e.g., Richard Brust, No More Kabuki Confirmations: There Are 
Better Ways to Vet a Supreme Court Nominee, 95 A.B.A. J. 38 (2009). 
 59. Adam Liptak, Justices Opt for Fewer Cases, and Professors and Law-
yers Ponder Why, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at A18, available at 2009 WLNR 
19160652. 
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presentations were delivered at over twenty-five law schools 
throughout the United States from coast to coast. Stras’s record 
of scholarship and outreach mark him as one of the outstanding 
scholars in the Law School’s distinguished history. 
In addition to compiling a record as a leading scholar on 
courts and judges during his six years on the Law School facul-
ty, Stras also demonstrated great skill and ability as a class-
room teacher. In recognition of the excellence of his teaching, 
he was named Stanley V. Kinyon Tenure Track Teacher of the 
Year in the Law School. His courses gave students great in-
sights into the work of the U.S. Supreme Court. Drawing upon 
his close relationship with Justice Clarence Thomas of the Su-
preme Court, for whom he clerked, Stras was able to bring Jus-
tice Thomas into the Law School to teach with him in his class 
on Selected Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law. Ob-
viously, having a Supreme Court Justice as a teacher in their 
course was immensely popular with Stras’s students and a 
highlight of their law school experience.  
Stras’s concern for students was demonstrated beyond 
classroom teaching, as well. He served as faculty advisor for the 
Minnesota Law Review, and actively worked with the students 
to identify potential authors and articles. Stras was a member 
of the Judicial Clerkship Committee for most of the years he 
was a member of the Law School faculty. He cared for law stu-
dents and was a faculty leader in assisting students to land 
judicial clerkships following their graduation from law school. 
Stras’s impressive record of scholarship, teaching, and ser-
vice is extraordinary in the long history of the University of 
Minnesota Law School. The faculty, students, alumni, and 
friends of the Law School benefitted enormously from his time 
on the faculty. Stras now brings his keen intellect, principled 
judgment, talented scholarship, and his dedicated work ethic to 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota. The citizens of Minnesota 





Justice David Stras, Judicial Politics, and 
Federal Court Nomination Politics 
Timothy R. Johnson† 
I have known Justice David Stras since his first year on 
the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School. I do not 
remember now who sought out whom, but we were brought to-
gether by our common interest in understanding the pinnacle 
of the American federal judiciary—the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Specifically, while we were trained in very different ways—
David in the legal academy and me in the realm of political 
science—we shared the common viewpoint that the best way to 
understand the judiciary is through strong theoretical argu-
ments, good data, and sound empirical analysis. Our profes-
sional relationship quickly bloomed into a personal friendship 
as well. Thus, it is with great pride that I offer this short tri-
bute in Justice Stras’s honor. 
When I received the call from then-Professor Stras in late 
June of 2010 announcing he was about to be nominated by 
Governor Tim Pawlenty to Minnesota’s highest court, I was de-
lighted to say the least! I know Justice Stras is having the time 
of his life and, while we often disagree about politics and legal 
issues, he is a thoughtful, insightful, and excellent judge for our 
state. While we talk less often today given his new position, I 
seek to highlight his contributions to the academy in the years 
leading up to his appointment. In particular, while I briefly 
overview his major contributions, I focus on a topic about which 
we both have a great interest—the nomination and confirma-
tion process of federal judges.  
 
†  Morse Alumni Distinguished Teaching Professor of Political Science 
and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Copyright © 2011 by 
Timothy R. Johnson. 
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I.  JUSTICE STRAS AND THE ACADEMY: AN OVERVIEW   
For almost half a century since C. Herman Pritchett’s The 
Roosevelt Court,1 it was rare for political scientists and the le-
gal academy to cross boundaries to engage each others’ re-
search. While there was certainly some crossover between dis-
ciplines, it was not until the early 1990s that it became clear 
that these once competing communities had much to say to one 
another.2 Over the past twenty years such conversations and 
collaborations have led to many important insights into the ju-
diciary.3 In fact, such collaborations have led a number of major 
law schools to hire political scientists and many legal scholars, 
including Justice Stras, to join political science faculties as ad-
junct professors.4 
Since his time clerking for Justice Clarence Thomas during 
the 2002–2003 term, and until his elevation to the bench last 
year, Justice Stras was an integral player in this cross-
disciplinary movement. In fact, as he and I were beginning to 
work on several projects, he had already published with at least 
one political scientist.5 I know that, as he continues his impor-
tant work for the state of Minnesota, he will keep a finger on 
the pulse of research into a variety of areas of judicial politics 
and public law. Here I seek to highlight several of Justice 
Stras’s contributions to both the legal academy and to political 
science.  
One of the key differences between political scientists and 
legal scholars is that the latter are more willing to delve into 
important normative debates about the judiciary. Justice Stras 
 
 1. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948). 
 2. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statuto-
ry Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights 
Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613 (1991). 
 3. See, e.g., STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2009); Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Su-
preme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 489; Lee Epstein et al., Circuit Effects: How the Norm of Federal Judi-
cial Experience Biases the Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2009). 
 4. Four major scholars in the realm of judicial politics have been hired at 
prestigious law schools: Lee Epstein is the Henry Wade Rogers Professor at 
Northwestern; Kevin Quinn is professor of law at University of California, 
Berkeley School of Law; Andrew Martin is professor of law at Washington 
University in St. Louis; and Stefanie A. Lindquist is the A.W. Walker Centen-
nial Chair in Law at the University of Texas Law School. 
 5. James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 
99 GEO. L.J. 515 (2011). 
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is no exception. Thus, I begin with maybe his most interesting 
normative contribution to the literature. In the 2007 Cornell 
Law Review, Justice Stras took on the important yet controver-
sial topic of senior judge status in federal courts.6 In this study, 
Stras and his coauthor discussed the constitutional deficiencies 
of senior status and offered several solutions to what they de-
scribed as a “constitutional bind.”7 In fact, they made it clear 
that this system is both accepted and admired within the judi-
ciary. This analysis is the epitome of how Justice Stras used his 
research to bridge the gap between law and politics. Indeed, 
while this piece can be seen as a normative one, Stras demon-
strated how combining theory and qualitative evidence can be 
used to address and answer difficult questions about our sys-
tem of justice. 
Another important normative contribution from Justice 
Stras is his argument that Supreme Court Justices should once 
again ride circuit as they had done before the Courts of Appeals 
were created in 1891.8 This article demonstrates that the 
Court’s reasons for riding circuit during the first century of its 
existence apply equally to the twenty-first-century Supreme 
Court. That is, circuit riding exposes Justices to life outside of 
Washington, which forces them to face (and rule on) issues that 
may not otherwise appear before the Supreme Court. Justice 
Stras then suggests that requiring Justices to ride circuit 
would increase their workload and may ultimately encourage 
them to retire earlier than many do today. Normatively, for 
Justice Stras, this would be good for the federal judiciary as a 
whole.  
Beyond his melding of the normative with the empirical, 
Justice Stras clearly bridged the chasm between fields with his 
foray into the social scientific side of public law. In his scholar-
ship on the relationship between the work of Supreme Court 
clerks and the Court’s docket, Stras focused on two key areas.9 
 
 6. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007). 
 7. Id. at 458. 
 8. David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit 
Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710 (2007).  
 9. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law 
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 947 (2007) (reviewing 
TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WARD & 
DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006)). 
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The first part of this important article demonstrated the dra-
matic shift in the Court’s plenary docket. Indeed, Stras showed 
how the number of decided cases plunged by half between the 
time Chief Justice Rehnquist took over the Court (in 1986) and 
2003. He then turned to a closer examination of the role Justic-
es’ clerks play in setting the Court’s docket and how the cert 
pool may have played a role in the dramatic decline.  
Like others before him, Stras turned to one of the most in-
teresting and in-depth sources of data: Justice Harry Black-
mun’s papers at the Library of Congress. Specifically, he ana-
lyzed the certiorari pool memos to determine the impact of this 
institutional feature on the Court’s declining docket. Stras’s 
analysis led him to two key conclusions. First, he suggested 
that the chambers of Justices who do not belong to the certiora-
ri pool make more recommendations for the Court to hear cases 
than does the certiorari pool itself. Second, Stras found clear 
evidence of a correlation between the recommendations of the 
certiorari pool and whether the Court granted certiorari. The 
bottom line is that the insights Justice Stras gleaned from be-
ing a clerk himself, along with rigorous analysis of rich data, 
led him to provide important new insights into how scholars 
should understand the Court’s agenda-setting process. 
Finally, I turn to Justice Stras’s last published piece before 
his ascension to the bench. In the Georgetown Law Journal he 
and Professor James F. Spriggs II analyzed why the Court 
would ever issue plurality opinions that ostensibly do not hold 
the weight of precedent.10 As they stated, plurality opinions re-
sult when five or more Justices agree on the result of a case but 
not on the legal rule. In the first empirical analysis to examine 
this phenomenon, Stras and Spriggs examined the ideological, 
collegial, contextual, and legal factors that theoretically may 
lead to plurality decisions. They found, importantly, that a case 
is more likely to end in a plurality decision if it involves an is-
sue of constitutional interpretation (rather than one of statuto-
ry interpretation), and if the case involves an issue of civil li-
berties. Additionally, their study revealed that when a Justice 
in the majority is ideologically distant from the author of the 
Court’s opinion, and that Justice and the author have not been 
collegial with one another in the past, she is more likely to con-
cur in the result only. The point is that Spriggs and Stras pro-
vided strong theoretical reasons why understanding pluralities 
 
 10. Spriggs II & Stras, supra note 5. 
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is important and then identified factors that actually lead to 
these nonprecedent setting decisions. 
During his time at the University of Minnesota, Justice 
Stras certainly published on a variety of important topics. But 
perhaps his most important work focuses on the Supreme 
Court’s nomination and confirmation process. It is to that work 
that I turn in the next section. 
II.  POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE SUPREME COURT 
NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS11   
The modern-day Supreme Court confirmation process is 
among the most contentious aspects of American politics.12 The 
U.S. Senate and the President both believe that their institu-
tion is crucial to determining the next Supreme Court Justice. 
Whereas President Nixon, for example, believed the Senate 
should always acquiesce to the President’s choices,13 former 
Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT) re-
cently pointed out that the Senate’s role “is advise and consent. 
It isn’t advise and rubber-stamp.”14 This tension has made the 
confirmation process a seismic, and oftentimes public, battle 
between the President and the Senate.  
The importance of the Supreme Court confirmation 
process—and the resulting political battles—makes the subject 
an attractive area of study for political scientists and legal 
scholars. The Supreme Court confirmation process has been 
studied generally;15 scholars have also investigated specific as-
pects of it, including how Presidents choose nominees,16 how 
the ideological relationship between the President and the Se-
nate affects the ideology of the eventual nominee,17 and what 
drives individual Senator’s confirmation votes.18 
 
 11. Portions of this section are drawn from Timothy R. Johnson & Jason 
M. Roberts, Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 
66 J. POL. 663, 663–68 (2004). 
 12. See, e.g., President Reagan’s public defense of Robert Bork and Presi-
dent Nixon’s nominations of Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell. 
 13. See JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT 
NOMINEES 12 (1995). 
 14. Helen Dewar & Amy Goldstein, Appeals Court Choice Rejected, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 15, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WLNR 15300858. 
 15. See, e.g., GEORGE L. WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: 
THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS (1995). 
 16. See, e.g., CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: 
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT 
HOOVER THROUGH GEORGE W. BUSH (2007). 
 17. See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Pivotal Politics, 
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This scholarship has provided unparalleled insight into the 
interactions between the President and the Senate during the 
confirmation process.19 Most recently, Lauren Bell has studied 
the extent to which the increased activity of special interest 
groups has made the nomination and confirmation process 
more contentious and more difficult for a President’s nominee 
to be confirmed.20 
A second vein of theoretical and empirical work explores 
the President’s explicit choice of nominees. This research focus-
es on the spatial dynamics of the confirmation process and 
finds that aligning the President, the Senate, and the Court 
median along an ideological continuum allows scholars to accu-
rately predict the ideology of a President’s chosen nominee.21 
Scholars have also learned a great deal about what motivates 
the Senate to act on an institutional level and what drives the 
individual Senator’s confirmation votes. Sarah Binder and For-
rest Maltzman,22 for example, suggest the presence of divided 
government slows the confirmation process for lower court no-
minees. Segal finds that confirmation battles are as much 
about partisanship as they are about a struggle between the 
Senate and the President.23 Finally, John Massaro observes 
that ideological differences between the nominee and the Se-
nate play a major role in almost all failed nominations.24 
In sum, the literature analyzing the Supreme Court con-
firmation process demonstrates that the ideological relation-
 
Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations, 32 CONGRESS & 
PRESIDENCY 31, 31–48; Byron J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of 
Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choic-
es, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069, 1069–94 (1999). 
 18. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: 
Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Con-
firmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96, 96–118 (1992). 
 19. See, e.g., G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS (1981) (exploring the political exchanges for all executive nom-
inations); WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 15 (analyzing the political process 
for Supreme Court nominations). 
 20. LAUREN COHEN BELL, WARRING FACTIONS: INTEREST GROUPS, 
MONEY, AND THE NEW POLITICS OF SENATE CONFIRMATION 67–87 (2002). 
 21. See Moraski & Shipan, supra note 17. 
 22. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Con-
firming Federal Judges, 1947–1998, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 190, 196–97 (2002). 
 23. See Jeffrey Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: 
Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J. POL. 998, 1000–03 (1987). 
 24. See JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY 
AND PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT IN UNSUCCESSFUL SUPREME COURT 
NOMINATIONS 1–31 (1990). 
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ship between the nominee and the Senate—and the President 
and the Senate—plays a key role in the choices that Presidents 
make during the Supreme Court nomination process. It is here 
that Justice Stras’s most important work was done. Indeed, his 
essay in the Texas Law Review has made it clear that legal 
scholars and political scientists alike may have to reconsider 
the way in which they view, analyze, and ultimately under-
stand the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation 
process.25 
III.  JUSTICE STRAS’S CONTRIBUTION TO 
UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 
CONFIRMATION PROCESS   
Stras’s work on the confirmation process is similar to his 
analyses I discuss above. That is, it stands firmly at the inter-
section of political science and the legal academy. Indeed, he 
puts his work squarely in the social scientific theoretical debate 
and then provides several important policy and normative pre-
scriptions that may help presidents better navigate this 
process. 
His analysis of the confirmation process begins with him 
identifying the structural, judicial, and external factors that ac-
count for the politicization of the judicial appointments process 
over the past quarter century.26 For him, the structural factors 
include the Seventeenth Amendment and the proliferation of 
confirmation hearings featuring the judicial nominees them-
selves since the 1950s.27 Accordingly, both of these changes 
have led the Senate to take a more prominent role in who ulti-
mately ends up on the federal bench.28 Beyond structural fac-
tors, Justice Stras posited that external, organized interest 
groups and the mass media have also become key players in the 
confirmation process.29 Finally, he pointed out that the stakes 
of confirmation battles are even higher because the Court now 
 
 25. See David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Ap-
pointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1056–78 (2008) (reviewing BENJAMIN 
WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY 
TIMES (2006) and JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE 
INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2007)). 
 26. See id. at 1057–72.  
 27. See id. at 1058–62.  
 28. See id. at 1075–78.  
 29. See id. at 1062–68. 
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deals with many of the nation’s most hot-button issues—from 
campaign finance to reproductive freedom to GLBT rights.30  
For Justice Stras, the combination of these factors means 
the new politics of judicial appointments are so contentious 
that it has become one of the focal points of the political polari-
zation that is usually reserved for other issues within Con-
gress.31 The evidence he wields to support this claim is impres-
sive and suggests that scholars today need to make sure they 
account for these factors.32 But because of how he straddles the 
legal academy and political science, Stras goes beyond his em-
pirical findings to make normative and policy statements about 
this process.33 Most generally, he suggests his findings are not 
only academic.34 Rather, he makes clear they will help relevant 
actors—Presidents, Senators, and the nominees—better navi-
gate this highly contentious process.35  
More specifically, Stras makes three key policy prescrip-
tions for the President that may improve the process. First, he 
argues Presidents should employ political tools to smooth the 
confirmation process for their preferred judicial nominee.36 In 
other words, Presidents account for the various external con-
straints and the preferences of key Senators when they make 
an initial choice of who to nominate.37 Second, Stras believes 
Presidents can help win confirmation for their nominees by 
“going public” in support of a nominee.38 Third, Stras suggests 
that if the President faces a particularly hostile Senate, he 
could resort to recess appointments.39 This strategy would at 
least allow a nominee to sit on the bench until the end of the 
next session of Congress.40 In the end, Stras suggests Presi-
 
 30. See id. at 1068–72. 
 31. See id. at 1034–35.  
 32. See id. at 1072–76. 
 33. See David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating the New Politics of 
Judicial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869 (2008) (reviewing 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME 
COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007)). 
 34. See Stras, supra note 25, at 1078. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Stras & Scott, supra note 33, at 1896–02.  
 37. See id. at 1898–02.  
 38. See id. at 1902–06 (citing Johnson & Roberts, supra note 11, at 665–67). 
 39. See id. at 1906–10. 
 40. See id. at 1906 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3). 
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dents have the means to ensure that the confirmation process 
for their judicial nominees goes as smoothly as possible.41 
CONCLUSION 
While here I only provide an overview (and smattering) of 
Justice Stras’s academic research, the glimpse it provides de-
monstrates his desire to speak to two academies that had, for 
many years, deliberately ignored one another. The academy 
needs more of this type of work. And, while I reiterate how good 
a judge I believe Justice Stras will be, he (and his scholarship) 
will be missed. 
 





Tribute to David Stras: Under the 
Microscope 
Ryan W. Scott† 
In July 2010 my former professor and longtime collabora-
tor David Stras began service as an Associate Justice of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court. The nomination was an inspired 
choice, and a fitting tribute to Professor Stras could cover a lot 
of ground. As a scholar, he has quickly established himself as 
one of the nation’s brightest and most influential commentators 
on the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal judiciary. As a 
teacher, he received a Teacher of the Year award for his work 
in the classroom. As a mentor, to me and to countless other 
students, he has worked tirelessly as an advisor and advocate. 
A tribute to Professor Stras might praise his radio and televi-
sion analysis of the judicial appointments process, or his out-
standing Federal Courts casebook,1 or his commentary at the 
leading Supreme Court web site, SCOTUSblog.2 
But I want to focus, instead, on the rich irony of Professor 
Stras’s latest career move. After years of research on judicial 
decisionmaking, placing judges under the microscope, he has 
somehow managed to hop under the microscope himself. Before 
joining the court, he generated an impressive body of scholarly 
writing that scrutinizes and challenges judges’ decisions. He 
has cheerfully proposed methods of manipulating judges into 
leaving the bench.3 He has suggested increasing judges’ work-
 
†  Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloo-
mington. Copyright © 2011 by Ryan W. Scott. 
 1. ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL & DAVID R. STRAS, FEDERAL 
COURTS (2d ed. 2009). 
 2. See, e.g., David Stras, The Politics of the Sotomayor Nomination, 
SCOTUSBLOG (May 31, 2009, 7:11 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/05/ 
the-politics-of-the-sotomayor-nomination. 
 3. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a 
“Golden Parachute”, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2005). 
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load,4 while openly discussing whether to reduce their support 
staff.5 He has even questioned the constitutionality of senior 
status, the generous retirement program prized by the federal 
judiciary.6 Some of these excesses, no doubt, can be blamed on 
reckless and irresponsible coauthors. Still, after spending the 
better part of his career devising innovative ways of provoking 
judges, how did this guy become a judge himself? 
Professor Stras’s groundbreaking work on the judiciary de-
serves greater attention, not only because of its importance to 
scholars but because of what it reveals about his future as a 
justice. This Tribute summarizes three strands of Professor 
Stras’s scholarship—on judicial retirement incentives, the judi-
cial appointments process, and decisionmaking on the Supreme 
Court of the United States—that have proven especially in-
fluential. Although his writing frequently places judges under 
the microscope, it also reflects a profound respect for the work 
of the courts, and for the proper limits of the judiciary in the 
constitutional design. 
I.  JUDICIAL RETIREMENTS   
As other contributors to this Tribute have noted, Professor 
Stras’s early work focused on judicial retirement decisions, and 
in many ways charted the course of his later scholarship. In 
The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement,7 he proposed 
and developed a rational-choice decision model for judicial re-
tirements. Drawing upon research into judicial opinions, espe-
cially the attitudinal and rational-choice models of judicial de-
cisionmaking advanced by political scientists, Professor Stras 
contended that judges behave rationally in determining wheth-
er and when to retire.8 Recognizing that retirement decisions 
are rational, he argued, has important implications for policy-
 
 4. David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit 
Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710 (2007).  
 5. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law 
Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 947 (2007) (reviewing 
TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WARD & 
DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006)).  
 6. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007).  
 7. David R. Stras, The Incentives Approach to Judicial Retirement, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2006).  
 8. Id. at 1431. 
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makers who hope to change judicial retirement patterns. Fixed-
term lengths, mandatory age limits, and similar direct meas-
ures for restricting judicial tenure are not the only options.9 
Equally viable, he contended, are indirect methods that alter 
judges’ incentives, for example by manipulating their retire-
ment income and workload.10 
Other articles developed and applied the incentives ap-
proach. In Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Para-
chute”11 and a follow-up piece,12 Professor Stras and I weighed 
in on the long-standing debate over life tenure for federal 
judges. We acknowledged that, despite its advantages, life te-
nure creates a serious risk of mental infirmity among elderly 
judges, which threatens the performance and legitimacy of the 
courts. Yet we criticized “command and control” measures like 
mandatory age limits and fixed terms for Supreme Court Jus-
tices, instead recommending less drastic reforms that would 
not require a constitutional amendment.13 Empirical research 
by political scientists and economists, we noted, has demon-
strated that throughout the nation’s history the single strong-
est predictor of judicial retirements is pension eligibility.14 We 
therefore proposed a “golden parachute” for Supreme Court 
Justices, providing strong financial incentives to retire in a 
timely fashion—especially upon experiencing a serious mental 
disability—rather than clinging to office into extreme old age.15 
In Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit 
Again,16 Professor Stras turned to the workload of Supreme 
Court Justices. He proposed resuscitating the nineteenth-
century practice of “circuit riding” by compelling Supreme 
Court Justices to spend a week or more each year sitting as 
judges on the federal courts of appeals.17 Circuit riding would 
benefit the Justices themselves, he argued, by wrenching them 
from their isolation in Washington and exposing them to other 
judges, lawyers, and communities. He argued that the Court’s 
 
 9. Id. at 1419. 
 10. Id. at 1446. 
 11. Stras & Scott, supra note 3. 
 12. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical Analysis of Life Te-
nure: A Response to Professors Calabresi & Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 791 (2007).  
 13. Stras & Scott, supra note 3, at 1426–39. 
 14. Id. at 1447–49. 
 15. Id. at 1455–59. 
 16. Stras, supra note 4. 
 17. Id. at 1735–37. 
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work product would improve if Justices were required, from 
time to time, “to grapple with the gaps or inconsistencies in the 
Court’s contemporary opinions or the challenges faced by lower 
courts in implementing them.”18 Moreover, increasing Justices’ 
workload would also provide a strong incentive to retire in a 
timely manner. Social science research has confirmed a signifi-
cant relationship between federal judges’ workload and their 
retirement decisions. Measures like circuit riding, which would 
make Supreme Court Justices’ work much more demanding, 
therefore can be expected to induce earlier retirement.19  
Another important advantage of Professor Stras’s proposal, 
in my view, is that circuit riding might provide a particularly 
strong retirement incentive for mentally infirm Justices. Today, 
a Justice whose mental health is failing can easily “hide out” in 
Washington, insulated by protective law clerks and Court staff, 
seldom interacting with outsiders. A weeklong stint serving 
with a new slate of judges, however, poses a real risk of public 
embarrassment for a mentally infirm Justice. That makes a 
dignified resignation more attractive. 
Several of Professor Stras’s strengths as a scholar are evi-
dent in his early work. His writing on judicial retirements and 
workload focuses on practical questions—what works?, what 
doesn’t?, what institutional hurdles realistically can be over-
come?—and not just abstract debates about theory and doc-
trine. At a time when much legal scholarship is aimed primari-
ly at other academics, Professor Stras has produced a body of 
work that is of equal interest to judges and lawmakers, devel-
oping and defending concrete proposals for legal change. In ad-
dition, his writing on judicial retirement and workload show-
cases his facility with empirical methods. Not content to 
speculate about how judges will respond to changing incentives, 
from the outset he has grounded his proposals in the kind of so-
cial science research that too many law professors overlook. 
II.  JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS   
Next Professor Stras wrote several articles analyzing 
changes in judicial appointments. In Understanding the New 
Politics of Judicial Appointments,20 he catalogued key structur-
 
 18. Id. at 1731. 
 19. Id. at 1733–34. 
 20. See David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Ap-
pointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1056–78 (2008) (reviewing BENJAMIN 
WITTES, CONFORMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY 
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al, external, and judicial factors that have contributed to in-
creasing politicization of the federal judicial appointments 
process in the last century. One underappreciated structural 
change was the Seventeenth Amendment, which has required 
the direct election of Senators since 1913. Another was an 
amendment to the Senate rules in 1929 to require roll-call 
votes for judicial confirmations.21 Structural changes, including 
the direct election of Senators and roll-call votes and public 
committee hearings on judicial nominees, made Senators di-
rectly and publicly accountable for their votes on judicial nomi-
nations.22 External forces such as interest group lobbying and 
intense media attention now play a powerful role in whether 
the nominee is confirmed to the Supreme Court.23 Meanwhile, 
the judiciary itself has contributed to the politicization of the 
process by injecting itself into hot-button social and political 
questions and thereby raising the stakes of each new confirma-
tion battle.24 Professor Stras dissented from the common view 
that Presidents have caused the confirmation process to become 
more divisive by “selecting ideologically controversial nomi-
nees.”25 Presidents’ “ideologically driven selection” of nominees, 
he argued, is primarily a response to the aggrandizement of the 
power of the federal judiciary, and therefore “more of a symp-
tom than a cause of the new politics of judicial appointments.”26 
In a follow-up article, Navigating the New Politics of Judicial 
Appointments,27 Professor Stras and I extended that analysis to 
the confirmations tug-of-war between the President and the 
Senate.  
III.  SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING   
Most recently, Professor Stras has made two important 
contributions to the empirical literature on Supreme Court de-
 
TIMES (2006) and JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE 
INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2007)); see also David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating 
the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869 (2008) (re-
viewing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007)). 
 21. Stras, supra note 20, at 1061–62. 
 22. Id. at 1059–62. 
 23. Id. at 1062–66. 
 24. Id. at 1069. 
 25. Id. at 1071. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Stras & Scott, supra note 20. 
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cisionmaking. The first, a study called The Supreme Court’s De-
clining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation,28 
traces the dramatic decline in the size of the Supreme Court’s 
docket between 1981 and 2007 to changes in the Court’s mem-
bership. Using the private papers of Justice Harry Blackmun, 
now available at the Library of Congress, Professor Stras gen-
erated a unique new dataset of certiorari votes for every case 
on the Court’s plenary docket between 1986 and 1993.29 The 
data are striking. Different Justices voted to grant certiorari 
“at considerably different rates,” and several new members of 
the Court—Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg—voted to 
grant certiorari at a much lower rate than the Justices they re-
placed.30 Scholars frequently attribute the decline in the Su-
preme Court’s docket to the certiorari pool, the elimination of 
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, and changes in the actions 
of the Solicitor General’s office. Professor Stras’s study power-
fully demonstrates that, whatever the influence of those fac-
tors, turnover in the Court’s personnel also has played a central 
role. 
The second, Explaining Plurality Decisions,31 is the most 
comprehensive study to date of plurality decisions on the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Cases that produce only a plurality opinion, 
with one or more opinions concurring in the judgment, have 
come under criticism because they often provide unclear and 
unstable answers to high-profile legal questions.32 Professor 
Stras and coauthor James Spriggs developed a case-level model 
of plurality decisions, identifying a host of ideological, collegial, 
legal, and contextual factors that might contribute to a break-
down in the process of coalition building and compromise ne-
cessary to produce a unified opinion for the Court.33 They 
found, surprisingly, no evidence that ideological factors syste-
matically influence when, or how often, the Court issues plural-
ity opinions.34 Instead, the strongest predictors of a fractured 
Court related are legal and contextual: constitutional interpre-
tation, common law and administrative review cases are more 
 
 28. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A 
Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMM. 151 (2010). 
 29. Id. at 153. 
 30. Id. at 155–58. 
 31. James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 
99 GEO. L.J. 515 (2011). 
 32. Id. at 518. 
 33. Id. at 532–43. 
 34. Id. at 545. 
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likely to produce a plurality opinion, while cases reviewing cir-
cuit splits in the lower courts are less likely to produce a plural-
ity opinion.35  
These studies mark Professor Stras’s transition from a 
consumer to a producer of first-rate empirical work on the Su-
preme Court. That evolution should come as no surprise, given 
his long-standing joint appointment in the political science de-
partment and his regular contributions to the Empirical Legal 
Studies blog. In an increasingly interdisciplinary world, he has 
proven himself capable both as a legal scholar and as a social 
scientist. 
IV.  JUSTICE STRAS   
But here’s the irony. For all of their strengths, Professor 
Stras’s articles do not read as if they were written by an aspir-
ing judge. To the contrary, they mostly treat judges as objects 
of study and objects of manipulation. 
Professor Stras’s research frequently places judges under 
the microscope as objects of study. His work reflects a keen in-
terest in the factors, conscious and unconscious, that influence 
judicial decisionmaking. And he has never hesitated to engage 
the political science literature that emphasizes the role of 
judges’ attitudes and strategic choices. His research on the Su-
preme Court, for example, has demonstrated that Justices’ 
ideological values, turnover of Court membership, and collegial-
ity can concretely affect judicial outcomes. Judges rarely ac-
knowledge those influences. 
His scholarship also cheerfully encourages legislatures to 
manipulate judges. In his work on judicial retirements, he has 
championed an “incentives approach.” He proposes, for exam-
ple, enhancing Supreme Court Justices’ retirement benefits 
(through a “golden parachute”) while ratcheting up their work-
load (through circuit riding), as a way of inducing mentally in-
firm Justices to leave the bench in a timely manner. Judges 
seldom embrace that kind of carrot-and-stick approach to their 
own decisions. 
To put it mildly, that is an unusual background for a newly 
minted Justice. But I predict that Professor Stras’s distinctive 
perspective on judicial decisionmaking will serve him well on 
the court. His familiarity with the distorting effects of ideology, 
honed by years of research, gives him an unusual ability to rec-
 
 35. Id. at 547–48. 
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ognize and avoid them.36 And his calls for reform, especially his 
proposals for workload and retirement incentives, reveal a 
healthy sense of the judiciary’s limited role in the constitution-
al design. I trust, as he repairs from Mondale Hall to the Judi-
cial Center, that Professor Stras will retain the intellectual ri-
gor, curiosity, and modesty that have made him an outstanding 
scholar and collaborator.  
On behalf of the many law professors he leaves behind, I 
wish Justice Stras congratulations. Enjoy life on the other side 
of the microscope. We look forward to scrutinizing your every 
move in the years to come. 
 
 36. E.g., Stras & Scott, supra note 20, at 1873–74, 1879. 
